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This paper constructs a trade general equilibrium model for a less developed country with
three sectors. One is the informal and un-tradable sector characterized by ￿ exible wages,
while the other two sectors are tradable, export and import sectors. The model imposes
a binding minimum wage over the unskilled labour and e¢ cient wage distortions on the
skilled labour. Comparative statics is driven to analyze the e⁄ects on the labour market as
consequence of opening the economy, raising the minimum wage and the introduction of an
augmenting productivity in the export sector.
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Open economic process in less developed countries (LDC) leads the essential discussions
about which are its main e⁄ects over the labour market. This analysis is relevant for the
labour factor due to the impacts on the economic e¢ ciency and on the social welfare. As ￿t
is well-known a high national income percentage is produced in the labour market and any
e⁄ect on this market has a signi￿cant economic importance in the economy wide.
International trade and its e⁄ect on unemployment rate variations are related to the
social welfare. While unemployment people are one of the biggest economic problems in
all countries, trade economic models had tended to abstract it. Most trade models are full
employment and ￿ exible wages. Outside of economics profession, there are people who think
that one of the most important e⁄ects of trade is the destruction of jobs, leading to signi￿cant
unemployment rates. Nevertheless that the previous result will be expected, international
trade is also related to the creation of jobs as a result of the new economic dynamic. Recently
several labour international trade models are taking into consideration unemployment e⁄ects
as a result of sticky wages and imperfect labour mobility.
A model of trade and labour market involving two countries is developed by Davis
(1998). One country represents the stylized characterization of ￿ exible-wage markets, while
the second represents an economy with labour price rigid as consequence of ￿xing a minimum
wage. Davis￿paper points out that the ￿rst country arises its inequality among high and
low wages while in the second country the unemployment climb dramatically. Both types of
economies are integrated by two sectors; one of them is skilled labour intensive relative to
the other one. Unemployment cannot arise in the ￿ exible wage country. Instate, in an entire
integrate equilibrium, the second country must absorb the full integrated equilibrium level
of unemployment to sustain the minimum wage level that is determined by both countries.
1The main goal of the present paper is to construct a general trade equilibrium model,
for a LDC with three-sectors, where the existence of unemployment rate is a general rule.
There are two tradable sectors, export and import sectors, and where the mobility of skilled
workers is imperfect and the wage paid for unskilled workers is a minimum ￿xed by the gov-
ernment. The third is an un-tradable sector that demands only unskilled workers, character-
ized by ￿ exible wages, and this is constituted by a set of small enterprises. The unemployed
unskilled workers are represented mainly by households working in informal activities and
other people without jobs, such as they are considered by Marjit (2003).
Imperfect mobility of skilled workers between export and import sectors is explained
by the existence of turnover costs, when workers need to be hiring and training. In general,
new hired workers do not have the same skill than the quitting workers. Those costs reduce
the turnover tenure rate and are a decreasing function of their own wage rates. That issue
is discussed widely by Stiglitz (1974). The turnover costs are introduced in this paper under
the concept of e¢ ciency wage theory, in the sense that higher wages result in some cases in
higher productivity levels. When wages are higher than the market-clearing wages due to
e¢ ciency reasons, the unemployment rate rises in an equilibrium state (Fields, 2009).
The paper￿ s model also considers some mobility restrictions on the unskilled worker
between tradable and un-tradable sectors. It is assumed that unskilled people have some
preference to be employed in the tradable sector than in the un-tradable sector as con-
sequence of their higher wage rate and better working conditions. The direct implication
of the previous restrictive factor conditions are that unskilled people allocated in the trad-
able and un-tradable sectors exhibit some imperfect mobility, and this is measured by the
elasticity labour mobility, such as it was suggested in a pioneering article by Casas (1984).
Casas introduces imperfect labour mobility in a standard two-sectors and two-factors general
equilibrium model. His hypothesis is that there are mobility restrictions to equate the low
2to the high wages in the economy, even in the long run. Such as Casas￿ s paper, the elasticity
of labour mobility is set in the paper￿ s model by a parameter to accomplish this issue.
In this paper unskilled workers employed in the organized tradable sectors receive
relatively high contractual wage, a minimum wage, while their counterparts engaged in the
un-tradable sector earn a lower competitive wage. So, unskilled people earn two di⁄erent
wages in two di⁄erent segments of the labour market, and the model integrate unemploy-
ment rate that is caused by both imperfect labour mobility and by sector-speci￿c sticky wage.
Some authors like Parai and Beladi (1997) integrate unemployment labour rate by manu-
facturing sticky-wages, according to the Harris-Todaro variety. Wei and Yabuuchi (2006)
examine additionally the implications of wage subsidy policy and factor production growth
on unemployment rate using as well the Harris-Todaro Model. The previous two models are
characterized by the existence of both imperfect labour mobility and urban unemployment.1
There is strong theoretical evidence that trade openness in LDC produces unemploy-
ment when prices of imported goods fall. However, the expanding export sector might o⁄set
that e⁄ect and it is more evident if this structural change produces an augmenting pro-
ductivity in the economy. Several studies have shown that higher productivity is strongly
correlated with the export status (Davidson and Matusz, 2005).
Empirical research has documented both the imperfect inter-sector labour mobility
and wage di⁄erentials in the economies. Imperfect labour market adjustment cannot be
explained only by observable di⁄erences in worker or job characteristics that might require
compensations. These issues have been examined by Fajnzylber and Maloney (2005), and
Goldberg and Pavcnick (2003 and 2005).
1The consequences of economic liberalization policies on the skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the LDC
are analyzed theoretically by Marjit (2003) and Chaudhuro and Yabuuchi (2007).
3The main paper ￿ndings are as follows: i) Free trade policies in a small open LDC
could explain some unemployment levels if the market frictions and institutional restrictions
are considered; ii) The unemployment e⁄ects might be o⁄set if the trade liberalization im-
proves both the e¢ cient allocation resources in the economy and the productivity in the
export sector; iii) A positive export perform in the economy might increase the un-tradable
sector and decrease the unemployment rate; in such way that more productive ￿rms will be
bigger, earn higher pro￿ts and demand more workers; and iv)The positive e⁄ects induced by
export sector will be reduced if the minimum wage is raised.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic
model. Section 3 analyses the comparative statics when the economy is liberalized. Section 4
considers the negative impacts when the minimum wage is increased and the positive e⁄ects
of an augmenting productivity level in the export sector. Last section concludes.
2 Model framework
Let de￿ne three sectors by analytical convenience: two tradable sectors, export and import
sectors, and an un-tradable sector. Outputs are x, y, and n respectively, such that x and y
are produced using skilled and unskilled workers (Li,and Lui, where i=x,y) under constant
returns to scale technology. The un-tradable sector (n) demands only unskilled workers (Ln).
The model is a static labour market and its equilibrium is the state toward which
the market tends and, once there, it stays in. That equilibrium will not be labour market-
clearing. The paper purpose is to analyze of equilibrium positions, particularly on their
interaction owing to their link via trade, and not the dynamics by which they are reached.
Only the production side of the economic system is described, and then the ￿rst order
conditions are derived. A reduced form is obtained in order to analyze the comparative statics
4(see Appendix 1). The results conduct to explain the skilled - unskilled workers employed,
as well the unemployment changes when in a LDC applied a more oriented open economy.
2.1 Basic equations
There are six basic equations. Three pro￿t sector equations that set up the behaviours of two
tradable sectors and the only one un-tradable sector; two balances of skilled and unskilled
workers, and an equation which explains the imperfect unskilled labour mobility between
the tradable and the un-tradable sectors.
Firms wish to maximize their pro￿ts and to do this they must minimize their labour
costs. This means that they hire workers, raise wages, and improve worker quality if these
decisions are in their pro￿t-maximizing interest to do so. Firms in the tradable sectors pay
a higher wage to the skilled workers if these wages raise the labour productivity (Stiglitz,
1974). This is the e¢ ciency wage theory, where higher wages could result in some cases in
higher productivity levels (Fields, 2009).
Sector outputs are obtained according to the Cobb-Douglas functions. In addition,
there is the assumption that export sector is intensive in skilled labour with respect to the
import sector. The two pro￿t equations in the tradable sectors are written as follows.
The export pro￿t sector (x)










[1 + ￿(1 + Sy)](1 + h)
￿1 ￿ C, (1)
and the import pro￿t sector (y)
￿y = (1 + Sy)(Ly)
￿y L
1￿￿y
uy ￿ ryLy ￿
_
WLuy ￿ Cy. (2)
The export price is a⁄ected negatively by (1 + S), and the import price positively
5by (1 + Sy).2 S is the external restriction parameter for the domestic exports and Sy is the
protected parameter for imports given by domestic tari⁄s.
The ￿rst term at the right hand in (1) and (2) are the output values obtained through
the Cobb-Douglas production functions. The following terms in (1) and (2) are the labour
costs, being r the skilled labour wage and
_
W the minimum wage ￿xed by the government
and paid to the unskilled people employed in the tradable sectors (Lux and Luy).
"h" is a technology percentage index of progress. For the sake of simplicity, higher
productivity drives the export goods to be produced at lower marginal cost. Thus, total
labour cost is divided by (1 + h), bigger than one, so that at any point of time ￿rms decide
how many people employ. The imported component for the export sector is introduced by
the parameter ￿, whose value is less than one.
The last terms (C and Cy) in (1) and (2) are the training-hiring costs and are functions

















The turnover skilled labour costs, or the tenure average period, are a decreasing func-
tion of the wage paid to the skilled workers (r) and an increasing function with respect to the
minimum wage rate (
_
W). They play a dominant role in explaining the skilled unemployment
rate in the tradable labour market (Stiglitz, 1974).
Parameters ￿ and ￿y are the share of skilled workers in the production function, while
the parameters b and by capture part of the turnover cost for skilled workers. The feasible
2By assumption prices of exports and imports are equal to one.
6parameter values are de￿ned as follows:
0 ￿ ￿y < ￿ ￿ 1; (b ￿ 1);(by ￿ 1) > 1; and 0 < ￿ < 1.
The un-tradable sector is characterized by a free-entry sector such that prospective
workers enter only as a last resort. This is a subsistence sector and the minimum wage paid
to people hired by the tradable-formal sector sets its maximum level. The un-tradable sector
pro￿t function is written as
￿n = f (Ln) ￿ WnLn; where f￿
(Ln) > 0 and f ￿(Ln) > 0: (3)
Unskilled workers (Ln), allocated at the un-tradable sector, show a positive but di-
minishing marginal productivity. Thus people hired in this sector are paid by their marginal
productivity (Wn).
The skill and unskilled worker balances are given by the following identities. The
skilled labour market balance
_
L = Lx + Ly + Ld, (4)
and the unskilled labour market balance
_





Lu be the endowments of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively. The
skilled and unskilled people unemployed are standing by Ld and Lud, respectivelly.
2.2 Unskilled labour market
Tradable sectors o⁄er relatively attractive wages as other favourable conditions for unskilled
workers; while the un-tradable sector, integrated by small ￿rms and some of them in the
7informal economic activity, o⁄ers relatively unattractive ones.3 For that reason reallocation
of employment from tradable to un-tradable sector could be considered undesirable. The
un-tradable sector is de￿ned by the following properties: free entry and competitive markets;
unregulated activity; and skills are acquired outside the formal school system.
So that, it is assumed that unskilled workers do not move freely between the tradable
and un-tradable sectors. Imperfect mobility is described by the elasticity of inter-sector
labour mobility, such as it was introduced by Casas (1984). The assumption is that whatever
the initial wage di⁄erential between the two sectors, a change in the wage ratio is required to
induce movements of workers in either direction. However, this movement will not continue
inde￿nitely, and this will come to an end. Once a new allocation of workers are reached and
constitutes the equilibrium, that state will be stable even though it involves di⁄erent wages
between sectors.











where ￿ is the elasticity of labour mobility, and it is assumed to be constant.4 Labour is










A ￿xed minimum wage
_
W is paid to the unskilled workers employed by the tradable
3An opposite approach is that informal economy is a desirable sector that workers could choose in pref-
erence to a formal sector work. In this way there is an internal dualism, that combines two opposite
characterizations. Fields (2009) o⁄ers a summary of reasons why workers might want to be working in the
informal sector, such as: they could earn more, or at least hope to earn more; they value the self-employment
and the independence, among others.
4Casas (1984) derives this type of labour supply from a CES utility function.




That inter-sector wage di⁄erential explains why some unskilled workers are unem-
ployed (Lud). That outcome would not result in the economy if all jobless workers could
migrate again into the un-tradable sector and to be engaged in the economy activity.
When the wage gap between people hired by the tradable and by un-tradable sectors
is higher, more unskilled workers will stay in the ￿rst sector. In fact, more unskilled workers
migrate than the vacancies available in the tradable-formal sector and this feature explains
why some unskilled workers could be unemployed. The unemployment level acts to discour-
age further labour movements. As long as the wage gap is increased, the unemployment
equilibrium rate will be greater.
3 Comparative statics
Six ￿rst order conditions with respect to skilled and unskilled labour demands are derived,
and the skilled wages determined from (1) and (2). These conditions (see Appendix 1)
let conduct the comparative static analysis when trade policy, minimum wage, and export
productivity parameters change.
3.1 Reduced model
The six ￿rst order conditions (Appendix 1), the two labour balances, (4) and (5), and the
mobility restrictions over unskilled labour (6) set up the ten equilibrium conditions of the
model. They allow to derive the following results: three factor production prices (r, ry,
Wn), ￿ve demands for workers (Lx, Ly, Ln, Lux, Luy) and as well the unemployment rates
of unskilled and skilled workers (Ld, Lud).
















such that skilled worker wages are positively related to both minimum wage rate (
_
W) and
the training hiring costs per worker: For the export sector case (7), the skilled worker wage
is negatively related to the protected parameter for imports, Sy, and positively to the pro-
ductivity level, (1 + h).
Equations (4), (5), (6), (7 ), and (8) are replaced in the ￿rst order conditions. Then,
those conditions are di⁄erentiated with respect to labour demands, trade policy paramet-
ers, minimum wage, and technology changes. Finally a system of the second derivatives is
obtained and written in matrix form as
H ￿ dL = A ￿ dD; (9)
where H is the Hessian matrix (see Appendix 2); dL is a vector of labour variations and
writen in transpose form is
￿
dLx dLux dLd dLn
￿
. A is a vector of parameters that prem-
ultiply the vector dD. The last vector in transpose form is de￿ned as
￿
dS dSy dW dh
￿
.
The determinant of matrix J is
4 =




















and it is a decreasing function of the elasticity labour mobility (￿).
103.2 Trade policy liberalization
Trade policy e⁄ects on the labour market are considered in this paper through two channels.
The ￿rst e⁄ect is analyzed when the trade policy is ￿xed by foreign countries and has a
negative impact over the domestic exports, (1+S). The second is when trade policy is ￿xed
by the domestic country in order to restrict its own imports, (1+Sy). Thereby both policies
are oriented to reduce the international trade ￿ ows.
In the last decades restriction over trade ￿ ows in most countries have been substan-
tially reduced and the protection dispersion across products and sectors has been practically
minimized. These process of reforms have hit the import sector as the precedent protection
barriers had led many ine¢ cient ￿rms continue producing and as they had undertaken only
few productivity upgrades.
Nowadays countries design their trade policies to liberalize the international markets.
The more relevant trade policies are currently related to bilateral, regional, and multilateral
trade agreements that restrict the capacity of countries to change their trade policies. As a
matter of fact, they have taken the commitment to be involved in the process of globalization
and to move their economies toward an integrated world.
i) International trade restrictions induced by foreign countries, (1+S):
If these restrictions are removed by foreign countries, domestic ￿rms might set their
own exporting prices higher in the international market. The positive e⁄ects that produce
































(1 + S)(b ￿ 1)￿
< 0: (13)
11Reducing external trade restrictions on exports let the domestic ￿rms become more
competitive in the external markets. Policy liberalization in favour of exports brings the at-
tention on three meaningful results. First, there is a general reduction on the unemployment
rate in the economy wide. Second, export sector raises its demands for skilled and unskilled
workers, but labour demands from imported sector are not a⁄ected. And third, as long as
the export sector gets larger, wages paid for skilled workers go up and the unemployment
rate for both types of people go down.
Equation (14) is obtained using the results in 13, and shows a reduction of unskilled








(1 + S)(b ￿ 1)￿
> 0. (14)
ii) Cutting the domestic tari⁄, (1+Sy):
As the economy is opened to the external competition, many ￿rms are restructured
and stay in the market, but others has to close. When the domestic government cuts its
tari⁄s, the expected intuitive results on the skilled labour are gotten in the model. Skilled
workers employed in the export sector increase since this sector is expanded, and this is
shown in (15). By contrast, the import sector is depleted and therefore its demand for
















￿ = (1 + ￿(1 + Sy))(1 + h)(b ￿ 1) > 0:
12There are two opposite forces that a⁄ect the unemployment rate on the skilled workers,
such as it is pointed out in (17), results that are derived from equations (15) and (16). On
the one hand, there is a favourable relation between the trade policy liberalization and
the skilled labour demanded by export sector, and thus unemployment rate of this kind of
workers tend to go down. On the other hand, there is an unfavourable e⁄ect on the import
sector and therefore the unemployment rate of this type of workers tends to increase. The
net e⁄ect depends on which sector is bigger. If that sector is the tradable import sector, the









￿y (by ￿ 1)(1 + Sy)
￿
. (17)
However both e⁄ects are reduced by the training hiring costs, such as it is given by
(b ￿ 1) for the export sector, and (by ￿ 1) for the import sector. It is well known that job
creation takes time, while job destruction can take place immediately. Hence, there would
be a higher unemployment rate if the import sector, where the price falls, is the dominant
economy activity.
The results on unskilled workers are the following. Since there is an imported com-
ponent in the production of the export sector, cutting-tari⁄s conduct to reduce the unskilled
labour demand in this sector if the augmenting productivity (h) is not big enough (18). This
makes sense when ￿rms located in this sector have the possibility to import intermediate




(b + 1 ￿ ￿ (h + 3))￿Lux
￿￿
> 0, (18)
lower demand of unskilled people in the export sector let the tradable import sector and the
un-tradable sector to increase their demands for this kind of people (19 and 20). But at
the same time the last two sectors are a⁄ected negatively as consequence of lower protective
custom barriers. The net e⁄ect on the unskilled people demand with respect to the two
13previous sectors will depend on which is the dominant sector in the economy. If this sector
is tradable-import sector, then a reduction of custom barriers a⁄ects negatively the demand
for this type of workers. In turn, a large migration of unskilled workers from tradable sector























￿y (by ￿ 1)(1 + Sy)
￿
. (20)
Since there are unskilled labour mobility restrictions between the tradable and un-
tradable sectors, given by the expression ￿ in (20), any e⁄ects of removing tari⁄s in the
economy are de-escalated by the market frictions. The before comment is also applied to the
tradable sector frictions through the terms (b ￿ 1) and (by ￿ 1).5
Equation (21) is derived from equations (18) - (20). The main implication from (21) is
that trade liberalization conducts to increase the unemployment rate on unskilled workers as
long as the import sector is the largest in the economy. If there are not acceptable economic
opportunities in the un-tradable sector, where the market entry costs for ￿rms are relatively
low, some workers are forced to be unemployed. As far as the export sector is expanding,
that negative e⁄ect could be reduced. It is worth to say in this case that mobility restrictions












￿y (by ￿ 1)(1 + Sy)
￿
: (21)
An additional implication in this section is the inter-sector wage di⁄erential arising
from imperfect labour mobility. Once new allocation of the labour force is established,
and constitutes a new stable equilibrium, this involves di⁄erent wages rates among workers
5Those parameters are the skilled labour frictions but they a⁄ects indirectly the unskilled labour market
through the production functions.
14allocated in di⁄erent sectors. International trade liberalization leads to increase the wage
gap between the skilled workers employed in the export and import sectors (7 and 8). As
long as the share of the export sector goes up, the unskilled labour wage gap between the
minimum wage and the wage paid in the un-tradable sector raises. The last outcome is due
to the decreasing marginal productivity in the un-tradable sector.
The main theoretical results obtained in this section could be summarized in the fol-
lowing propositions:
A process of international market liberalization in a LDC produces the following e⁄ects
on the unemployment rate in the economy, and on the unskilled workers employed by the un-
tradable sector:
i) Open trade in both sides (e.g. free trade agreements) produces two positive e⁄ects
on export sector that conducts to reduce the unemployment rate for both skilled and unskilled
workers. That result is a⁄ected negatively by a reduction in the labour demands for both types
of workers in the import sector. Additionally, those e⁄ects are cut down by the turnover
cost, for the case of skilled workers, and labour mobility restrictions, for the case of unskilled
workers.
ii) International trade policy liberalization produces a mixed e⁄ect on the un-tradable
sector and on unemployment of the unskilled workers. More competition on import sector
leads the un-tradable sector to reduce its labour demand and therefore this e⁄ect raises the
unemployment of the unskilled worker. The previous e⁄ect is in some degree o⁄set by the
labour adjustment in the export sector.
154 Changing the minimum wage policy and the aug-
menting export sector productivity
This section is divided in two folds. First, there is a short discussion on the e⁄ects of a
minimum wage change on the unemployment level for di⁄erent types of workers; and second,
the model is examined when a boon of productivity is produced by the free trade, especially
on workers employed by the export sector.6
4.1 Changing the minimum wage rate policy
A critical issue related to the free trade agreements is the e⁄ects that a minimum wage policy
produces on the labour market. Since higher minimum wage rises the skilled workers payment
(7 and 8), there is an unambiguously negative e⁄ect over the skilled labour demand. Higher
wages drive up production cost, that erodes the country￿ s comparative advantage and destroy
jobs. Hence the unemployment exists because the entire labour market is subject to an
exogenously speci￿c ￿ oor, or minimum, which exceeds the level required for full employment.
However, the negative e⁄ect over skilled workers may be reduced by the turnover cost, (b ￿ 1)
and (by ￿ 1).

















































6Currently, there are positive spillover e⁄ects on the rest of the economy.
16The e⁄ect on the unskilled worker demands is equally negative. Three important
features should be highlighted. First, lower demand for unskilled workers hired by the export
sector is in part reduced as long as the turnover-cost is bigger. Second, negative e⁄ect on
the unskilled workers allocated in the import and in the un-tradable sectors goes up, such
as the elasticity of labour mobility increases. And third, the previous results are increasing























(b ￿ 2￿ + 2)










































Consequently, a minimum wage exacerbates the unemployment rate on the unskilled
workers in the economy (28). That result is positively related by the number of workers



























W (1 ￿ ￿)
> 0.
(28)
4.2 Augmenting the export sector productivity
Negative e⁄ects that are produced by increasing the foreign competition on the import sector,
could be overwhelming if the international trade could boost export sector productivity,
especially for skilled workers. This positive aspect is reached simply by ￿nding better ways
to use more e¢ ciently the existing skilled workers and other resources no considered in this





(h￿ ￿ ￿ + 2)Lx






(2h￿ + 2￿ + 2)Lx
(1 + h)
2 (b ￿ 1)￿
< 0: (30)
Opening the economy activity to international trade exposes producers to great com-
petition, forcing them to cut cost and increasing their e¢ ciency while providing greater
access to more and better inputs. International trade helps to reallocate resources in favour
of more productive uses, as it is the export sector. In the extreme case, where the higher
productivity (￿) is located only in the export sector, the demands for all types of workers
in this sector go up (29) while the workers employed in the import activities go down (30).
Thus, the net e⁄ect is that the job creation exceeds the job destruction.7 In this sense the














(￿ (h ￿ 1) + b + 1)Lux
(b ￿ 1)(1 + h)
2 ￿
< 0: (32)
At the same time, higher productivity would probably bene￿t both formal and in-
formal ￿rms, and in addition could provide incentives for formalization some of them.8 The
result in (33) shows that un-tradable sector raises, in despite of the import sector is not
a⁄ected by spill over positive e⁄ects, in terms of productivity. In general, ￿rms that operate







(￿ (h ￿ 1) + b + 1)Lux
(b ￿ 1)(1 + h)
2 ￿
> 0: (33)
7Davidson and Matusz (2005) ￿nd a strong negative correlation between net exports and job destruction
using data for both Canada and USA economies.
8Golberg and Pavnik (2003) ￿nd weak evidence about the relation between trade liberalization and the
informal employment for Colombia and Brazil. Their model implies that trade liberalization leads to an
increase of informal employment.
185 Conclusion
The model analyzed in this paper is consistent with the stories on how a LDC exposure to
international trade creates opportunities for some ￿rms, especially in the export sector, while
simultaneously contributing to the downfall of other ￿rms in the import sector. In essence,
protection for trade is in relation to shelter ine¢ cient ￿rms. There is evidence that exposure
the economy to trade forces leads the less productive ￿rms to exit from the market.
International trade works as a catalyst to dynamize the productivity in the economy,
especially in the export sector. When empirical analysis considers permanent trade liberaliz-
ation episodes, like P. Dutt et al. (2009), there is an immediate rising in unemployment, but
in the long term that result tends to be reversed. But a policy oriented to raising the min-
imum wage minimizes those favourable e⁄ects. An increase in the minimum wage conducts
the economy to reduce its capacity to compete in the international markets and therefore
the overall unemployment rate jumps up and the labour demand realized by the un-tradable
sector falls.
References
[1] Casas, Francisco R. (1984), ￿Imperfect Factor Mobility: A generalization and synthesis
of two-sector Models of International Trade￿ , The Canadian Journal of Economics 17,
4, 747-761.
[2] Chaudhuri, Sarbajit; and Shigemi, Yabuuchi (2007), ￿Economic liberalization and wage
inequality in the presence of labour market imperfection￿ , International Review of Eco-
nomics and Finance 16 592-603.
[3] Davis, Donald (1998), ￿Does European unemployment prop up American wages? Na-
tional labor markets and global trade￿ , The American Economic Review 88, 3, 478 -
494.
[4] Davidson, Carl and Matusz, Steven (2005), ￿Trade and turnover:theory and evidence￿ ,
Review of International Economics 13, 5, 861 - 880.
19[5] Dutt, Pushan; Mitra, Devashish; Ranjan, Priya (2009), ￿International trade and unem-
ployment: Theory and cross-national evidence. Journal of International Economic, 78,
32-44.
[6] Fields, Gary S. (2009), ￿Segmented labor market models in developing countries￿ , in
Harold Kincaid and Don Ross, The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics,
Oxford University Press.
[7] Fajnzylber, Pablo and Maloney, William (2005), ￿Labor demand and trade reform in
Latin America. Journal of International Economic, 66, 423-446.
[8] Goldberg, Pinelopi and Pavcnik, Nina (2003). The response of the informal sector to
trade liberalization￿ , Journal of Development Economics 72, 463 - 496.
[9] Goldberg, Pinelopi; and Pavcnik, Nina (2005). Trade, wages, and the political of trade
protection: evidence from Colombian trade reforms. Journal of international Economics,
66, 75-105.
[10] Marjit, Sugata (2003), ￿Economic Reform and Informal Wage - a General equilibrium
analysis￿ , Journal of Development Economics 72, 371 - 378.
[11] Parai, Amar K., and Beladi, Hamid (1997), ￿Labor movility and unemployment￿ , South-
ern Economic Journal 64, 1, 180-190.
[12] Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1974), ￿ Alternative theories of wage determination and unemploy-
ment in LDC￿ s: The labor turnover model, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 88,2,
194-227.
[13] Wei, Gu and Shigemi, Yabuuchi (2006), ￿Imperfect labor mobility and unemployment






















x = 0: (34)
@￿
@Lux























x = 0: (36)
@￿y
@Ly













y = 0: (37)
20@￿y
@Luy























0 (Ln) ￿ Wn = 0 and ; f
00 (Ln) < 0: (40)
Appendix 2
Total di⁄erentiating the ￿rst order conditions
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